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Abstract 
Are we, private lawyers and contract lawyers, not convinced that we share a common understanding of 
freedom of contract, of‚ freedom’, of ‚contract’, and of the restriction of freedom of contract through 
‘regulation’? Is this common understanding not the basis on which we all operate – implicitly or 
explicitly – in our intellectual discourse while cutting across different legal traditions and different 
legal cultures? I argue that this common understanding is no more than a rather superficial 
‘gentleman’s agreement’ which allows us to communicate with each other whilst maintaining our own 
preconceptions. In fact, there are different models of freedom of contract and regulation in Germany, 
France, the UK and the European legal order, each deeply ingrained in their respective intellectual 
history. 
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Introduction 
Are we private lawyers and contract lawyers not convinced that we share a common understanding of 
freedom of contract, of‚ freedom’1, of‚ contract’, of restriction of freedom of contract through 
‘regulation’2? Is this common understanding not the basis on which we all operate implicitly or 
explicitly in our intellectual discourse cutting across different legal traditions and different legal 
cultures?
3
 At the very least, in all countries governed by a market society and even more so if the 
market society is embedded into the Westernised model of democracy?
4
 
What if this common assumption turns out to be wrong or is no more than a rather superficial 
‘gentleman’s agreement’, which allows us to communicate with each other whilst maintaining our 
own preconceptions? Digging deeper into intellectual history, into legal theory and legal philosophy 
reveals that let us say that a French lawyer and an English common lawyer are not talking about the 
same thing, when they argue about ‘freedom of contract’. This becomes even more complicated if we 
look at the other side of ‘freedom of contract’, at limitations and restrictions, at reason and coercion,5 
set out via statutory regulation. We might agree on what a state is equating it with ‘nation state’, but 
we might have much more problems understanding and agreeing the meaning of ‘regulation’. 
‘Regulation’ can be private or public, if of statutory origin, it might facilitate freedom of contract or 
restrict it. It is statutory intervention, for good or for bad, liberal or welfarist, depending on one’s 
perspective that might trigger very different expectations and feelings/sentiments. Our perception on 
‘regulation’ very much depends on what we expect as citizens from ‘our’ state.  
A starter I – English-French defective swimming pools  
Let us refer as a starting point to a well-known pair of cases decided before English and French courts 
on a nearly identical problem. I have taken this example from Ruth Sefton-Green:
6
 a house owner has 
mandated a construction company to build a swimming pool in his garden. It turns out that the water 
depth does not comply with what was agreed by 22 cm. The house owner goes to court and asks the 
construction company to rebuild the swimming pool. Guess in which court he gets what he wants or 
where he fails to obtain his desired remedy? I think if I would ask for a vote of comparative lawyers, 
the result might be pretty clear, maybe near to a communist voting result, 99%. I would go even 
further. If consulted, non-lawyers with cross-cultural experience would come to the same result. Our 
preconceptions as lawyers and our cultural intuition as citizens unrelated to legal knowledge and the 
study of comparative law lead us to the assumption that the House of Lords
7 
grants compensation only 
                                                     
1
 For a German understanding, Di Fabio, Die Kultur der Freiheit, 2005. 
2
 H. Collins Regulating Contracts, 1999, more on Regulation Theories G. Marks, L. Hooghe, and K. Blank (1996) European 
Integration from the 1980s: state-centric v multi-level governance. Journal of Common Market Studies 34, no. 3: 341-378 
3
 See the writings of K. Tuori, Transnational law: on legal hybrids and legal perspectivism' Transnational Law: Rethinking 
European Law and Legal Thinking. Maduro, M., Tuori, K. & Sankari, S. (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
p. 11-57 47 p.; K. Tuori/S. Sankari (eds.), The Many Constitutions of Europe, Ashgate 2010. 
4
 For a worldwide view G. Teubner, Contracting Worlds. The Many Autonomies of Private Law, Social and Legal Studies 9 
(2000), 399, with comments by Ian Macneil, David Campbell and Oliver Gerstenberg, online http://www.jura.uni-
frankfurt.de/42852689/contracting_worlds.pdf 
5
 R. Knieper, Zwang, Vernunft, Freiheit, Studien zur juristischen Konstruktion der Gesellschaft, 1981. 
6
 The European Union, Law and Society: Making the Societal-Cultural Difference, in Th. Wilhelmsson/E. Paunio/A. 
Pohjolainen (eds), Private Law and the Many Cultures of Europe, Kluwer International, 2007, 37, at 52. 
7
 Ruxley Electronic vs. Forsyth (1996), AII ER 268. 
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whereas the French Cour de Cassation
8
 obliges the construction company to rebuild the swimming 
pool. What kind of rationale is behind setting aside all the legal doctrinal construction that we tend to 
invoke? The House of Lords starts from the premise that the swimming pool is usable, though not in 
the envisaged way and that pecuniary damage suffices to compensate the house owner. Implicit is the 
idea that it does not make sense to destroy a usable swimming pool just to meet the original 
agreement,  
a combination of pragmatic and utilitarian considerations. This will be explained as the ‘English 
model’.  
The French Cour de Cassation, however, rules exactly to the contrary. The company did not deliver 
on what it was supposed to do. That was the rational and the deeper ‘reason’. As the water depth 
deviated from the promised depth, the contract was not fulfilled and the swimming pool had to be 
rebuilt.  
The construction company bears the full costs of re-construction. Pecuniary damage does not suffice 
to compensate the house owner for the broken promise, or less morally and much more in the meaning 
of freedom of contract as expression of ‘reason/raison/Vernunft’ for the infringement of the 
commitment he has accepted. The ‘reason’ behind the agreement prevails over any other 
considerations one might and one could invoke. I look behind this rationale/reasoning when I discuss 
the ‘French model’ later on. 
Comparative lawyers will know the two cases and even the cases behind the cases,
9
 they will find 
explanations related to the differences between the common law and the French Civil Code. But there 
is more: if a layperson comes to the same result, it tells us something about our legal consciousness,  
the deeper assumptions we all share about our own legal systems, on the expectations we have in the 
functioning of the courts and of society, for good and for bad. The Eurobarometer is a neat indicator 
which allows for a deeper look into these differing pre-conceptions at least between the 28 EU 
Member States.
10
 We may now speculate on what a US court, a Canadian court, a Brazilian court, an 
Israeli court, a Dutch Court, an Italian Court or a German Court would have decided in a similar case. 
I am sure there are similar if not identical cases
11
 and I am equally sure that a survey of the citizens of 
these countries would lead to results similar to my English-French comparison. If my assumption is 
correct, then there must be a deeper layer of? behind the legal rules, enshrined in long grown cultures 
and traditions.  
Let me clarify already at this point that I do not argue that these layers are ‘eternal’ in the sense of 
Pierre Legrand’s12 famous article that European legal cultures are not converging. I will come back to 
this issue at the end of my considerations. 
A starter II – German tourists stranded in Florida 
My second example is well-known to European lawyers, maybe less so outside of Europe. It deals 
with consumer law an area of law, which is seen to restrict and limit freedom of contract via statutory 
                                                     
8
 Sefton-Green refers to Civ 3 11 May 2005, no. 03-21136, Bull civ III no. 103, (2005) RTDCiv 596 rebuilding a house that 
was 33 cm lower than the contractual stipulations; the swimming pool counterpart, however, is Cour de Cassation, 17 
November 1984, reported in H. Beale, H. Kötz, D. Tallon, Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law, Ius Commune 
Series, Hart Publishing, 2002, 689-690. 
9
 The two cases are not unique. They represent a well established and long standing doctrine, references in Sefton-Green, fn. 
1; see also F. Werro, Comparative Studies in Private Law, A European Point of View, in M. Busani/Hugo Mattei (eds.), 
The Cambridge Companion on Comparative Law, CUP 2012 at p. 132-133. 
10
 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm  
11
 The whole Trento project – the Common Core of European Private Law - is based on the idea that the same case is looked 
at through the eyes of different legal orders. http://www.common-core.org/ 
12
 European Legal Systems are not Converging, International and Comparative Law Quarterly Volume 45 (1996) pp 52-81 
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intervention. In the early 1990s, a German tourist had booked a package tour to Florida, transport, 
accommodation and nutrition, all inclusive at incredibly favourable prices – two weeks for 500 or 600 
German marks, roughly 250-300 Euro. Hundreds of German travellers availed of the offer. But – que 
sera sera. A group of German consumers were caught by surprise by the bankruptcy of the tour 
operator. In 1993, they found themselves stranded in Florida. The operator could not bring them home 
and they had to buy tickets to return to Germany.  
The legal outcome is well-known. Germany had not implemented in time Directive 90/314/EEC on 
package tours. This Directive had obliged Member States to shield consumers against the bankruptcy  
of tour operators, shifting the risk of default from the individual traveller to the community of 
travellers. The risk is thereby socialised, as all potential travellers have to cover the costs for a fund the 
tour operator provides.
13
 With reference to the Francovich
14
 doctrine, the stranded consumers sued the 
German state for non-compliance with EU law requirements, namely, the delayed transposition of the 
Directive. They asked for compensation or restitution of the costs of their return ticket. The Court of 
Justice of the European Union confirmed in Dillenkofer
15
 the liability of the German State. This was  
a costly lesson for the German state which had to pay roughly 20 Million German Marks or 10 Million 
Euro. Consumer organisations and consumer victims celebrated the judgment as a great success. 
The societal deeper dimension behind the conflict is of more interest here. Around the time of the 
conflictual debate on who should bear the costs of the stranded consumers, a German TV invited 
several of the stranded travellers and a special guest to a talk show. The special guest was an 
American,  
a consumer lawyer. The German consumers were given the opportunity to tell their stories. Many of 
them went to the German Embassy asking for financial support as it turned out that a single return 
ticket was 3 or 4 times more expensive than the price for the package tour. At some point the 
American lawyer spoke up and addressed a simple question to the stranded travellers and the TV 
community: why did you not chartered a plane, addressing both the class of stranded consumers and 
the German Embassy? He suggested that it would have been much less expensive for the stranded 
travellers or for Germany.  
The simple question brings to light the expectations of German citizens, first the expectation that the 
economically highly doubtful deal of two weeks holidays in Florida for 500 – 600 German Marks is to 
be realised. They trusted the contract – a deal is a deal. Maybe subconsciously they were also 
convinced that the German state would get them out, if the contractual expectations turned out to be 
wrong.  
Would Greek consumers or French consumers have had the same expectations of their contract with  
a package tour operator and of their state? Would they have behaved in the same way? Would they 
have also bombarded their embassies with complaints and expectations or would they have chartered a 
plane? What about American citizens flying to Europe who become stranding there? Would they have 
chartered a plane or would they have employed an American lawyer to fly to Europe and launch a 
class action?  
I assume that the expectations differ considerably. 
However, there is more at stake than human help provided by national embassies for stranded citizens. 
EU law equips all EU citizens with individually enforceable rights to claim from their state to pay for 
the transfer, provided the respective state has not implemented or not correctly implemented the 
                                                     
13
 Article 7 Directive 90/314/EEC provides for different models see St. Weatherill, EU Consumer Law and Policy, Elgar 
2005, 98-101; comprehensively, K. Tonner, Zivilrecht unter europäischem Einfluss: Die richtlinienkonforme Auslegung 
des BGB und anderer Gesetze – Erläuterungen der wichtigsten EG-Verordnungen (Herausgeber Gebauer/Wiedmann), 
Richard Boorberg Verlag, Stuttgart [u.a.], Kommentierung des Kapitel 13: Reisevertrag, 2. Auflage 2010. 
14
 ECJ Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v Italian Republic v. Pretura di Vicenza and Pretura di Bassano del 
Grappa – Italy; Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, ECR 1991 I-05357. 
15
 ECJ, Case C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 und C-190/94, ECR 1996 I-4845. 
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Directive on package tours. What is happening here? It is not that the Member States accepted liability 
voluntarily. It is the EU via the CJEU which had imposed it on the Member States. The individual 
enforceable rights are granted to all EU citizens, formally in their own right but substantively EU 
citizens are instrumentalised to guarantee the uniform application of EU law in the Member States. 
Thus, regulation of package tours via the EU does not only set boundaries to the freedom of package 
tour operators it also paves the way for more entrepreneurial freedom in a European market.  
The conditions for a journey into intellectual history 
I would like to take you with me on a journey to search for the reasons behind these preconceptions
16
 
and the deeper layers of what shapes our preconceptions. However, as my knowledge of the 
differences between legal orders is rather limited – I would claim to half a solid understanding of the 
French,  
the English, the American and the Italian legal order, let alone the one in which I was trained. I will 
take the German, the French, the UK and the EU legal order as a starting point to look for and to 
identify the deeper layers of freedom of contract. There is a word needed on what I understand by 
‘knowledge’,  
in particular in times where comparative legal methodology is in a state of crisis.
17
 When I was 
educated in comparative legal research in the 1970s and 1980s, the thinking in Europe still followed 
the ground breaking work of Zweigert/Kötz’s Introduction to Comparative Law18 so wonderfully 
translated by  
the late Tony Weir.
19
 Legal systems were grouped around ‘legal families’, mainly the four European 
families, the Romanic, the Germanic, the common law and the Nordic Countries, sharing a common 
European culture, the Roman law and the Christian canon law.
20
 The method applied was functional 
comparison, looking for the ‘best solution’, meaning the solution which fits best into the differing 
traditions of the states. What is more important here was the pedagogical message inherent to the idea 
of legal families. Engaging in comparative law and comparative legal method requires first and 
foremost knowledge of the language, but even deeper knowledge of the country, of the deeper layers 
of the respective societies. This kind of knowledge, however, had to be gained via training and 
education in the country itself. In that spirit, I benefitted from the opportunity to study law in 
Switzerland (the French speaking part), in France, in the UK, in the US and latterly in Italy. Today this 
sounds old-fashioned, as comparative lawyers have to be engaged in the comparison of countries and 
legal systems where they know neither the language nor the country’s history/culture(?). The EU 
promoted this kind of approach through its ever stronger insistence on ‘inclusion’, meaning not 
following the legal families, but covering the legal orders of 28 Member States. This leads to 
comparison via tables. I admit that I was involved in that approach. Interestingly enough, Legal origin 
                                                     
16
 On preconceptions, J. Esser, Vorverständnis und Methodenwahl in der Rechtsfinding, Athenäum, Frankfurt 1970, 
unfortunately this book has never been translated into English. Only an Italian version is available. 
17
 At least in Europe there is a whole wave of publications discussing private law: it is hard to do justice to all those who are 
writing on this. It might suffice to refer to The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, Edited by Mathias Reimann and 
Reinhard Zimmermann, OUP 2006, published online 2012 and the Elgar Encyclopedia Of Comparative Law, Edited by 
Jan M. Smits, 2006, paperback 2008. However, they all share a common concern. The old and established methodology 
of Zweigert/Kötz (see below) does no longer suffice to handle the ever bigger complexity of comparative law in a 
globalized world. 
18
 First version, Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung, 1. Auflage 1971, last version in English, K Zweigert/H Kötz 
Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd edition 1998 
19
 See Tony Weir, On the Case, Hart Publishing, 2012. 
20
 F. Wieacker, Voraussetzungen europäischer Rechtskultur Verlag Göttinger Tageblatt,1985, ins Englische übersetzt von 
Edgar Bodenheimer unter dem Titel ‚Foundations of European Legal Culture, The American Journal of Comparative law 
38 (1990), 1-29 
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theory (LOT) took the legal families approach seriously,
21
 which could have reinvigorated the 
Zweigert/Kötz approach. However, what really happened is that LOT revealed the weakness of 
thinking in families as it cannot do justice to the deeper traditions and cultures of the countries 
compared. R. Michaels labelled LOT ‘comparison in numbers’,22 trying to understand why 
comparative lawyers remained so speechless in their reaction and did not defend the functional 
method.  
However, the purpose of this paper is not to speculate on the future of comparative law as a legal 
method, all that I want is to take you with me on a journey of intellectual history, legal theory, a little 
bit of legal philosophy, methodologically speaking, into identifying the dominating 
‘Rechtsbewußtsein’ –  
the legal conscience.
23
 My considerations in this paper are built on previous research on the many 
concepts of social justice in private law
24
 and the (un)systematics of European legal culture,
25
 where  
I have tried to understand, to reveal and to model the deeper intellectual history and culture, at least 
with regard to France, Germany, the UK and the European Union. What I am doing here is to use this 
research and the arguments developed in order to transpose them to my question on the deeper layers 
of ‘freedom of contract’. I am fully aware that modelling by country is risky and that it might look as 
if traditions and cultures are not subject to political, economic and social change.
26
 I would defend, 
nevertheless,  
the idea that such grouping around models is useful in identifying differences and maybe in deepening  
our mutual understanding.  
Where to start with intellectual history? 
Where does one start with the intellectual history of freedom of contract and regulation? For freedom 
contract it should be the Roman law. Here we are on save historical ground. We can refer to the 
foundations of Roman law and how these foundations survived the last 2000 years not only in 
continental law, but also in the common law countries.
27
 However, the ground might be less stable and 
                                                     
21
 For an analysis of the different strains of LOT S. Deakin/K. Pistor (eds), Legal Origin Theory Edward Elgar 2012 
22
 R. Michaels, Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business Reports, and the Silence of Traditional 
Comparative Law, AJCL 2009, 765; M. Siems, Comparative Law, CUP 2014. 
23
 U. Raulff (ed.), Mentalitätsgeschichte. Zur Historischen Rekonstruktion geistiger Prozesse, 1987; Schulze, H. (1985), 
‘Mentalitätsgeschichte – Chancen und Risiken eines Paradigmas der französischen Geschichtswissenschaft’, Geschichte 
in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 36, 247-270; D. Kennedy, (2006), ‘Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 
1850-2000’, same author, The Rule of Law, Political Choices and Developing Common Sense both published in D. 
Trubek/A. Santos (eds), The New Law and Economic Development, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 19 and p. 95. 
In a European historical perspective S. Conrad/S. Randeria Geteilte Geschichten. Europa in einer postkolonialen Welt in 
the S. Conrad/S. Randeria (eds), Jenseits des Eurozentrismus. Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und 
Kulturwissenschaften, Frankfurt Campus, 2002, 9-49. 
24
 H.-W. Micklitz (ed.), The Many Concepts of Social Justice in European Private Law, Elgar 2011 
25
 The (Un)-Systematics of (private) Law as an Element of European Legal Culture, in Genevieve Helleringer/Kai Purnhagen 
(eds.), Towards a European Legal Culture, München/Oxford/Baden-Baden, Beck/Hart/Nomos, 2014, 81-115 
26
 Think of Hall/Soskice, P.A. Hall/D. Soskice, An Introduction to Varities of Capitalism, from same authors (eds), Varities 
of Capitalism – The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, 2001, 1, for a stock taking of the debate, D. 
Bohle/B. Greskovits, Varities of Capitalism Tout Court, European Journal of Sociology 50 December 2009, pp 355, for a 
strong critique voiced by W. Streek Re-forming Capitalism, Institutional Change in the German German Political 
Economy, 2009, 251, wo claims that the VoC neglects the two major driving forces of change in capitalist societies ‘fear’ 
(of the workers) and ‘greed’ (of the entrepreneurs). 
27
 R. Zimmermann „Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard are sweeter ...“ Condicio tacita, implied conditions und die 
Fortbildung des europäischen Vertragsrechts, Archiv für civilistische Praxis 193 (1993), 121 
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less safe than its promoters pretend.
28
 Regulation is much more complicated. It is obvious that the 
Roman Empire used – what we call today ‘regulation’ – to govern – what would be called today –  
the ‘economy’. However, it might suffice to recall that nowadays we associate ‘regulation’ with the 
existence of a state and a territory. This brings us to the Peace of Westphalian, concluded in 1648, in 
which the foundations of what later became the nation state were laid.  
In private law more broadly which includes freedom of contract, the benchmark for the beginning or 
the reinvigoration of Roman law is fixed to the foundation of the University of Bologna around 
1130/1140
29
 and the scholastic school of law. Following Berman,
30
 the starting point for the re-
establishment  
 
of Roman law, private law and contract law, is the conflict between the Catholic Church (the spiritual 
power) and the Emperor (the temporal power) which culminated in the conflict between Pope Gregory 
VII and Emperor Henry IV over the independence of the Church from the temporal power. Berman 
argues that the separation of spiritual and temporal power did not only initiate early state building, first 
of the Church and then the Emperor paving the way for the development of the nation state after the 
religious wars in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 century, but also the scholastic school of law in Bologna first and 
then elsewhere in Europe.
31
 The Crusades between the 11
th
 and the 13
th
 century led to a much stronger 
exchange between the West and the East, intellectual exchange via the reinvigoration of the old Greek 
and Roman philosophy, but also commercial exchange which went hand-in-hand with the Crusades. 
Hence, there is a link between the rediscovery of the Roman law, the split of spiritual and temporal 
power and the Crusades, which strongly underpins the need to locate the intellectual history of 
Western law(?) to that epoque. One might equally argue that the starting point of my undertaking 
could and should be the discovery of the Americas in the 15
th
 century and the growing conflicts 
between the Spanish and the English empires, without which the deeper intellectual history of the 
United States cannot be fully understood. The new strand of research initiated by Thomas Duve,
32
 the 
Director of the Max-Planck-Institut at Frankfurt am Main, emphasizes the links, interaction and 
interchange, culturally, politically and economically, between Europe and the ‘new World’, the two 
Americas. I will not go back that far.  
My approach is more modest and it is more closely tied to my European cultural roots, to the younger 
history of codified continental law and the then established role of the state in the economy and 
society. This paper owes its origins to an invitation to speak on social justice at the University of 
Sorbonne, Paris. Thinking about ‘justice’ in such an environment must coincide – at least this is what  
I am convinced of – with an analysis of the links between state-building and constitution-building, as 
well as private legal order building and codification. Whilst such a starting point offers joint 
perspectives in comparing France and Germany, it fell short by not taking the United Kingdom into 
account.  
If anything, a parallel may be drawn between the French Revolution of the late 18
th
 century and 
                                                     
28
 Much more nuanced in particular with regard to the transfer and re-transfer of laws between European countries and what 
became later their colonies, Th. Duve, Von der Europäischen Rechtsgeschichte zu einer Rechtsgeschichte Europas in 
globalhistorischer Perspektive, Max Planck Institute for European Legal History research paper series, No. 2012/01, 
shortened version in English European Legal History Global Perspectives Max Planck Institute for European Legal 
History, research paper series No. 2013-06. 
29
 Founded in 1088, but the charter came later in 1156, W. Rüegg, Geschichte der Universität in Europa. Bd. 1. München 
1993 
30
 H. J. Berman, Recht und Revolution. Die Bildung der westlichen Rechtstradition, Frankfurt 2001, p. 144 et seq. 
31
 H. J. Berman, Recht und Revolution. Die Bildung der westlichen Rechtstradition, Frankfurt 2001, p. 146 and p. 215.  
32
 See references above and in particular the documentation of the inauguration of the new buildings of the Institute, 
Rechtsgeschichte, Legal History, Journal for the Max Planck Institute für European Legal History, RG (22) 2014, 394 
pages. 
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German state-building of the 19th century on the one hand, with the Civil war and the conflict between 
the English Crown and Oliver Cromwell in the 17th century on the other. This is roughly the period  
I investigated in attempting to explain where the different patterns of freedom of social justice derive 
from. I use these findings in my attempt to transfer them an understanding of the deeper layers  
of freedom of contract.  
Modelling the many faces of freedom of contract 
The table labels the particular understanding of freedom of contract and regulation, rooted in 
intellectual history. In the following, I will explain the categorisation for the four countries under 
investigation and the European Union,
33
 and provide a rough account of the socio-economic and 
political background to the different models of autonomy and regulation in the three countries and the 
European union, thereby elaborating the characteristics of the many faces of freedom of contract in a 
bottom-up perspective.  
  
                                                     
33
 The following analysis is a developed an adjusted version of H.-W. Micklitz, The (Un)-Systematics of (private) Law as an 
Element of European Legal Culture, in Gene-vieve Helleringer/Kai Purnhagen (eds.), Towards a European Legal Culture, 
München/Oxford/Baden-Baden, Beck/Hart/Nomos, 2014, 81-115 
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Country 
Model of freedom  
of contract 
Intellectual history Regulation 
France  A political project  
Code Civil 
French rationalism 
Enlightenment 
Regulating contracts 
as a political 
counter-project  
Germany A liberal 
authoritarian/ 
paternalistic project 
Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch 
German idealism 
Metaphysics 
Regulating contracts 
as a technical 
bureaucratic exercise 
United Kingdom A liberal pragmatic 
project 
Common law 
Empiricism and 
Utilitarianism 
Pragmatism  
Regulating contracts 
to solve ‘concrete 
Problems’ 
European Union A technocratic 
project 
Regulatory private 
law 
Instrumentalism and 
functionalism 
Regulated freedom – 
enabling and shaping 
autonomy 
The English Model – Liberal and Pragmatic  
In English history there is no comparable event to the adoption of the Civil Code in France or in 
Germany. The civil war took place in the 17
th
 century and led to major changes in society and in the 
parliamentarian system. But, it neither yielded a constitution nor a coherent codified body of civil law, 
rather, it made way for the Declaration of the Bill of Rights in 1689. The French and the German legal 
systems, seen through the eyes of a common law lawyer (daring to suggest that this is possible for me, 
a civil law lawyer) share a relatively homogenous view on the role and function of freedom of contract 
in society. They are united in the idea of universal values that infiltrate legal principles and concepts. 
‘Autonomy’ or ‘autonomie’ belongs to the core of these values. This is exactly where common 
lawyers run into difficulties.
34
  
Therefore, the true difference between continental law and common law must be deeper and the 
reasons must date further back than the French revolution. The break-even point from which the 
continental legal and the common law system diverged in following different paths had to be 
identified. I tied my considerations to the clash between different philosophies, to the remaining 
influence of the scholastic in continental Europe and to its growing critique through nominalism in the 
UK. This was also around the time when the relative cultural unity of Europe during medieval times 
broke into pieces.
35
 I think it is empiricism which is responsible for the deep differences between 
continental and common law legal systems. Despite the strong intellectual exchange in particular 
between France and England, Hobbes imported ideas from France, Rousseau referred to John Locke, 
the ideas and concepts of Francis Bacon’s empiricism became prevalent after the failure of Cromwell. 
Empiricism paved the way for utilitarianism – and here we have the key to understanding the English 
reservations against regulatory intervention into the economy, but also the explanation for the typical 
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English pragmatism
36
 which allows for regulatory intervention, in case there is a concrete need for 
action.  
Both historical strings tied together justify my assumption that the continental European understanding 
of freedom of contract does not comply with philosophical, historical, economic and legal structures in 
England or – to put it the other way round – that England has paved the way for a legal system which 
is deeply rooted in nominalistic and utilitarian thinking. Freedom of contract lies at the crossroads of 
these deep roots in English intellectual history. Nominalism served to cut away the ideological barriers 
enshrined in the scholastic school of law, to free English contract law from the Pandectist heritage, 
utilitarianism went hand in hand with the rise of the English ‘trading state’ (Handelsstaat) which has 
its origins in the 19
th
 century.
37
 Contracting and contract law, the freedom of commerce, the freedom 
to conclude contracts, this is where the heart of English contract law lies. Freedom of contract, 
therefore, means first and foremost the economic freedom to voluntarily engage in economic 
transactions without any risk of statutory interferences, with the exception of paying taxes to the 
Crown.
38
 
In this way, the English way of viewing the role and function of contract law is much more economic 
(ökonomischer) in its basic assumptions as opposed to German Idealism (Kant, Fichte, Hegel, 
Schelling) or French Rationalism (Descartes, Pascal, Voltaire, Rousseau). It is a ‘shorter way’ from 
‘utility’ to economic efficiency and economic effectiveness than from duty, reason, will or spirit 
(Pflicht, Vernunft, Wille, Verstand, Geist). It can be much more easily adapted to European 
‘Integration through Law’,39 where judges and the judicial system are given a major role in the 
realization of the Internal Market.40  
What is the relationship between the particular English variant of freedom of contract and English 
legal culture? The English state is a liberal state. Its function is not to control the economic behavior 
but to guarantee freedom of contract first for the merchant adventurer in the 17th century, today for the 
business environment at large.
41
 Statutory intervention into the economy is feasible if there is a 
political need. Labour law legislation and consumer law legislation provide ample evidence for such 
an approach. The UK legislator was at the forefront of consumer legislation, with regard to consumer 
credit and to consumer safety the UK legislator has long set the benchmark for statutory intervention. 
Pragmatism guides statutory regulation via the legislator when comes to restrict the freedom to 
contract.  
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was between 1790 and 1830, when the last remnants of just price were stripped away. 
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This can be felt until today in the way in which the transposition of European consumer law directives 
are integrated or not into the English system. Directive 99/44/EC might serve as an example. The UK 
legislator rejected any attempt for a major revision of the English law on contracts, which would have 
challenged the foundations of freedom of contract and preferred to adopt a separate piece of law which 
stands side-by-side with the common law on contract on the one hand, and the Sale of Goods Act on 
the other.
42
 A similar continuity can be demonstrated in the recent decisions of the House of Lords as 
it then was on the control of unfair contract terms in consumer contracts under EU Directive 
93/13/EEC. This piece of EU law has led to irritation in the English system as it submits standard 
terms to a general fairness test, an approach which runs counter to the leading ideology of the English 
legislator,
43
 where regulatory intervention should be targeted to concrete problem solving, but not to 
reverse the supreme position of freedom of contract.
44
  
The basic formula which lies at the heart of the English legal culture can be condensed in one single 
formula – what is useful is right. Here nominalism, empiricism and utilitarianism come together. 
Freedom of contract is foundational to common law on contracts, statutory intervention is acceptable 
as long as it aims at solving concrete consumer or labour concerns. 
The French Model – Rational and Political  
France has a particular standing in the legal and theoretical discourse on the interrelationship between 
constitution-building and private legal order-making. It follows from the French revolution, the results 
of which are still today stamping our understanding of ‘a’ constitution, ‘a’ civil code, a ‘contract’,  
a ‘tort’. The key events in France took place in the space of two decades, contrary to England where 
no such clear cut events, at least not with regard to constitution-building and private legal order-
making, can be fixed. The French Revolution led to a break
45
 with feudalistic structures and instituted 
a bourgeois society governed by individual freedom and equality of rights that became even more 
visible in the Code Civil and in the French Constitution.
46
 Its legacy can easily be traced in the German 
Civil Code which has adopted a century later. I start from two premises: 
Firstly, the vision of the French revolution which was proclaimed in the Declaration of Human Rights, 
pinned down in a Constitution and later codified in the Civil Code has deeper social, cultural, 
economic and intellectual roots. I argue that today’s conception of freedom of contract in France can 
best be understood as a political forward-looking concept. This goes back to French Rationalism
47
  
and Descartes.
48
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Secondly, French society may be characterised by the tension between, on the one hand, intellectual 
projects guided by ‘les grandes idées’ – the French Constitution and the French Code – which 
strengthen the power of the Executive to the detriment of the power of the Judiciary, and on the other 
hand, the highly politicised bottom-up resistance against an excessively far reaching executive 
power.
49
  
The fight over ‘the Social’50, the fight over regulatory intervention to protect workers in employment 
contracts and later the consumers in b2c contracts demonstrates that setting limits to the freedom of 
contract via statutory intervention is a highly political and politicised matter throughout society, 
subject to conflict, support or rejection.  
Just as in England, the intellectual turning point can be attributed to the fading influence of scholastic 
thinking. Its questioning of the spirit derived from methodological scholastic constraints paved the 
way for a particular French rational method in philosophy. Montaigne (1533-1592) set long lasting 
incentives for critical reflection of all existing knowledge and values, what was later named 
‘Enlightenment’.51  
The new method to investigate the ‘truth’ and the concept of the truth was left to the 17th century, to 
Descartes who began with his Discours de la Méthode. He claimed that a particular method to acquire 
the truth is needed, which then allows to solve all philosophical questions. For in Descartes’ 
philosophy ‘what is true is useful’ and not ‘what is useful is true’ like in utilitarianism. Without 
Descartes it is hard to understanding the particular political conception of the French Civil Code. 
Descartes’ philosophy results in the priority of theory over practice which is the basic thesis of French 
intellectualism. 
Once this is assumed, the link between the French political project of freedom of contract and the 
particularities of the French legal culture become clear. Freedom of contract is first and foremost tied 
to the key function of the ‘reason’ – ‘raison’ – ‘Vernunft’ in the French Civil Law system. The idea is 
that freedom of contract is more than just an exercise to maximise mutual economic benefit. There is 
more at stake in the communication between the parties, the commitment to a contract is the product 
of  
a ‘reasonable decision’. ‘Autonomie de la volonté’ is bound to the belief/assumption (Einsicht) in  
a higher reason, one which reaches beyond and deeper than the individual transaction.
52
 This is the 
Cartesian side of the concept of ‘autonomie de la volonté’. However, there is also the Rousseauean 
side and it is here where the political dimension of the concept of ‘automomie de la volonté’ is more 
obvious. ‘Autonomie de la volonté’ may not be equated with individual freedom in the meaning of 
German idealism. It is just the contrary, it is not inward looking it is outward looking towards society, 
to the embedding of ‘reason’ into the political environment, this is what Rousseau calls the ‘volonté 
générale’. Without Rousseau’s concept of democracy and the conviction that the people will consent 
to the ‘volonté générale’ chastened by sense/reason? (aus Einsicht) it is not possible to understand the 
political dimension of the ‘autonomie’ in the French civil code.53  
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France is also peculiar with regard to the role and function of regulatory intervention into the economy 
to the benefit of workers and consumers, to the overall idea of restricting the freedom of contract in 
commercial transactions through statutory regulation. Since mercantilist times the French state plays 
and claims to play a strong role in the organisation and the making of the economy.
54
 The economy 
has to follow political prerogatives in order to meet social/societal concerns or any other political 
requirements. What matters in our context is the strong link between the role and function of the 
political and the understanding of regulatory intervention. The political dimension may not necessarily 
result from a top down perspective, from the legislative introducing what is called in today’s language 
social regulation, or the Executive which was and is the key actor in managing the economy of the 
country, the political may also emerge bottom up, from resistance in the streets against the supremacy 
of the state managed economy over politics.  
In order to demonstrate the strong continuity of the French Rechtsbewußtsein, of the breadth and depth 
of the political in social regulation, I will again start with reference to the implementation of EU 
Directive 99/44/EC on consumer sales. Under strong pressure from civil lawyers and civil law 
doctrine, quite similar to the foregoing debate over the implementation of Directive 85/374/EEC on 
product liability, the French legislator decided not to integrate the rules on consumer protection into 
the Civil Code but to place the respective articles in the Code de la Consommation.
55
 This strategy 
saved the integrity of the Civil Code, as an ‘eternal’ political project, which might be regarded as an 
integral part of the French ‘identity’.56 However, there is one notable difference to the English method  
of transposition. Contrary to the UK, France adopted a Code de la Consommation which was 
originally designed according to a political model, a blueprint which similar to the Civil Code could 
guide the development in Europe of a consistent body of consumer law rules.
57
  
Contrary to most other Member States in the EU, the consumer movement in France bore a strong 
political dimension, at least in the 1970s and 1980s, which largely derived from politicisation through 
integrating consumer policy into politics. Trade unions in France are tied to the different left wing 
parties. Each of them had to leave their footprint on the then new policy.
58
 It is only through the EU 
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taking over consumer policy in the second half of the 1980s after the Single European Act that 
consumer policy became de-politicised in France.  
The German Model – Liberal and Authoritarian/Paternalistic 
The German Civil Code is a hundred years younger than the French Civil Code. In the aftermath of the 
Congress of Vienna, 1815, the scattered German regions (kingdoms, counties (earldoms), regions) 
failed to unite into a German state, under its own constitution. It took until 1871 before Germany 
managed, under the regime of the Prussian king/emperor and his chancellor Bismarck, to adopt  
a constitution and a further thirty years before the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch was enacted. I build my 
arguments around two major guiding assumptions:  
Firstly, there is a direct line from Kant to Savigny to the formal rationality of the private law system 
(Weber) which serves to constitute the capitalist society. The Kantian philosophy inspired Savigny in 
the foundation of the so-called ‘Historische Schule,’ which gained a dominating influence during the 
19th century and which, remarkably, continues to gain influence even after the fall of the wall in 
1989.
59
 It has created a particular way of thinking, which favoured the rejection of ‘The Social’ into 
the ‘pure’ private law system. Social issues, social regulations were outsourced via a technocratic 
decision to special private law legislation outside the BGB, although adopted 100 years later even 
beyond the more integrative approach of the French Code Civil.
60
 This divide gives the German BGB 
a particular ideological outlook, maintaining and defending an early 19
th
 century bourgeois model of 
society and economy against the rising political and social transformations brought about by the 
industrial age  
and the labour movement.
61
  
Secondly, there is the link between Fichte, Hegel, Thibaut, German idealism, and legal naturalism, as 
expressed in Jhering, v. Gierke, Ehrlich, Weber and Kantorowicz, wherein national ideals were tied to 
social ideals of a society and a nation.
62
 Such a vision can hardly be connected to the authoritarian 
Prussian state that accepts the responsibility for guaranteeing social protection to workers (1883 health 
insurance, 1884 accident insurance) only as a means to compensate workers from their exclusion from 
political participation (so called Sozialistengesetze 1978). The German version of legal naturalism 
favours an instrumental use of social regulation,
63
 though carefully avoiding and downplaying the 
political dimension inherent in ‘The Social’. 
The intellectual quarrel of the two German law professors, Thibaut and Savigny over the value of  
a codified German Civil Code is still paradigmatic for the tensions in the German legal system: 
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Thibaut fighting in Heidelberg enthusiastically – inspired by German Idealism and ‘les grandes idées’ 
of the French revolution – for a genuine German Code, Savigny fighting brilliantly (but not 
enthusiastically) for the maintenance of the old Roman law.64 Law-making in the Germany of the early 
19th century was understood as an academic exercise, quite contrary to the democratic discussion that 
surrounded the adoption and distribution of the French Civil Code, a heritage which can be felt until 
today.65  
The outcome was a civil code lacking the required ‘socialist oil’,66 a defect which was remedied by the 
judges/judge-made law in the 20th century and by the legislator through the adoption of numerous 
special laws, which overcame Savigny’s resistance but which was inspired by his way of thinking. 
German legal culture may be characterised by two leading components, on the one hand the liberal 
dimension, Germany shares with England, - enshrined in commercial freedom to contract – on the 
other the political dimension Germany shares with France – enshrined in the much stronger 
commitment at least in relation to England to ‘The Social’.67 The English inspiration dates back to the 
merging of the German Länder under a tight Prussian grip which triggered the industrial revolution. It 
led to an amazing boost for the economy. Here the predominance of the market and a sense of English 
pragmatism can be felt. The German state, however, is not the liberal enabling state in the Anglo-
Saxon sense. The German state is rooted in the authoritarian heritage of pre-democratic times. Here 
the state is seen as the key regulator meant and in charge to realise not only economic but also political 
objectives, which brings German legal culture nearer to its French counterpart. Contrary to France, 
where the political also bears a strong bottom-up dimension, in Germany the political dimension is 
always linked to expectations set by the citizens of the state. The early Bismarckian regulatory state 
and the post-World War II welfare state bears until today elements of this authoritarian care-taking 
different from England due to the strong interventionist side, and different from France due to the lack 
of an open political discourse. The tension between the two poles the liberal and the authoritarian 
explains why in Germany political debates so easily turn into ideological conflicts, just as it was 
between Thibaut and Savigny. 
What does this mean for the German variant of freedom of contract, - intellectual history provides us 
with the term ‘private autonomy’ (Privatautonomie) – and the limitation/restriction of freedom of 
contract/private autonomy via statutory regulation? Private autonomy centres on the individual, who is 
the individual, the reasonable Cartesian French person/citizen?, the utilitarian Englishman or the 
idealistic Kantian/Hegelian subject? Through what can he/she bind him/herself – this is the key 
question in German legal theory, not the commercial transaction, not freedom of contract, not the 
common law of contracts or the droit des obligations. The conceptual difference is visible in the 
comparison between the common law and the Code Civil. Only the German BGB contains a ‘general 
part’ –  
einen Allgemeinen Teil, which does not only precede the law of contract, but also family law and the 
law of succession. The General Part holds the German private law systems as enshrined into the BGB 
together. Its configuration outside Germany yields irritation and uncertainty (what is a juridical act? – 
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Ein Rechtsgeschäft?
68
). The key to understanding the idealistic German concept of private autonomy is 
its grounding in the so-called Willenstheorie (the will theory
69
), the individual is bound through his/her 
will, not through his or her declaration (Erklärung). It is true that already the Prussian legislator in the 
BGB introduced corrections which have been amplified by the judiciary in the 20
th
 century. Idealistic 
thinking enshrined in the concept of private autonomy is still alive, it has been taken up by the 
Freiburg school, ordo-liberalism and the private law society.
70
 Its counterpart, the resistance against 
restrictions more often than not bears a strong ideological bias which is outweighed by intense 
legislative activities in the 20
th
 century to the benefit of the weaker parties to contracts.  
Again, I will use Directive 99/44/EC as a blueprint to explain the continuity of the German 
Rechtsbewusstsein, the tension between the liberal and the authoritarian side of ‘freedom of contract’. 
In 2002, in the shadow of the so-called modernisation of German contract law (Schuldrechts-
Modernisierungsgesetz), the executive, i.e. the Ministry of Justice, used the expiry of the two years 
implementation period to realise the 20 years long pending project of a revision of the German Civil 
Code thereby ‘smuggling’ the bulk of consumer contract law rules into the German Civil Code, 
perhaps not in an authoritarian but in a paternalistic move.
71
 The academic attention focused nearly 
entirely on the proposed revision of the prescription rules, on Leistungsstörungsrecht (interference 
with or impairment of the performance of an obligation). The revision has been performed as a 
technical bureaucratic exercise.72 Pragmatism might have guided German scholars to accept the 
development of a new sales law, as a common pattern for b2b and b2c relations, but contrary to France 
and the Netherlands there was no deeper political discussion in the open democratic fora, in particular 
not on the possible role of consumer law as an integral part of the civil code. Until today, consumer 
law has remained an alien part in the German BGB. The integration of the ‘Social’ has not led to an 
overall  
re-thinking of the foundations of the German BGB. The two parts stand together apart, each enshrined 
in their very particular intellectual history.
73
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The European Model – Enabling and Restricting 
The ‘European legal order’ and the ‘European constitutional charter’74 has yielded, over the last sixty 
years, a genuine model of freedom of contract, a model which establishes freedom of contract to the 
benefit of the participants in an ever growing Internal Market, but at the same time setting boundaries 
to the established freedom.
75
 How come, how is it possible that the EU is able to generate a different 
model? I am not so much interested in whether the emerging European model should be understood  
as some kind of reaction to the globalization of markets, a Polanyian variant of the transformation of 
the economy.
76
 My focus is on the intellectual history of the European legal order that underpins 
Europe and more closely the European Union. The two – Europe and the European Union – have to be 
kept separated, although they are intertwined as will have to be demonstrated. 
Perspective matters. Seen from the outside, in particular through the lenses of US research, Europe is 
treated as a rather homogenous whole. It might suffice to recall the writings of James Whitman
77
 on 
US consumerism vs EU producerism or Daniel Kelemen
78
 on Eurolegalism. There is not much 
difference made between south and north, east and west, the European Union and the European 
Council, there is no discussion on where Europe ends, it is just Europe in contrast to the United States, 
Europe often implicitly equated with the European Union. This kind of thinking has been triggered 
and promoted through the ‘Integration through Law’ project by M. Cappelletti/M. Seccombe/J. 
Weiler
79
 aimed at comparing the constitutional architecture of the then European Economic 
Community and the United States. The deep imprint of thinking in EU/US contrast (the old and the 
new world at a time) is easily to realize/understand?. Each European might come to similar 
conclusions provided he or she spends  
a couple of months in the United States, or in South East Asia. I have never had a stronger feeling of 
‘being European’ than when I returned to ‘Europe’ after six months of a research sojourn at the 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. So there must be something that is genuinely ‘European’ in the 
national legal systems despite all the bifurcations and differences of the ‘shared’ intellectual history. 
But what exactly is it? Is it the deeper cultural layer, F. Wieacker, P. Grossi and H. Coing,
80
 are 
referring to in their efforts to rebuild Europe after the Second World War? Or is this perception more 
closely and more narrowly linked to the European Union, which has its own history after 60 years of 
existence?
81
 But what kind of history is it? Is the European Union developing its own intellectual 
history? How is the EU intellectual history linked to those European countries, which do not belong to 
the EU?  
My research question is modest, but complicated enough. I want to look at the interaction between the 
different legal, political and philosophical foundations for the time period I investigated in the 
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intellectual history of the UK, France and Germany. Is it possible and feasible to find and identify a 
joint deeper layer, one, which is more concrete than the reference to the ‘common European legal 
culture’.  
Is there a common denominator of English Utilitarianism, French Rationalism and German Idealism, 
which is mirrored in the conception of freedom of contract and its statutory limitation? Is there a 
baseline between ‘English liberal and pragmatic’ – ‘French rational and political’ – ‘German liberal 
and authoritarian’? To what extent did the intellectual crossover unfold a mutual impact in the three 
nations? Those who stress the common cultural layer insist on the intellectual exchange between the 
great minds behind the concepts of empiricism, utilitarianism, rationalism, enlightenment and 
idealism. For centuries European intellectuals shared a common language ‘Latin’, which only 
gradually vanished in the 17
th
, 18
th
 and 19
th
 century. But it cannot be language alone. Let me take an 
example from private law history to make my point. In the late 19
th
 early 20
th
 century leading private 
lawyers from all over Europe and the United States were involved in intellectual exchange, but they all 
wrote in their respective languages.
82
 It seems as if the intellectual exchange was much more intense 
hundred years ago –  
or hundreds years ago – than it is today in a world, where the English language dominates the 
intellectual discourse and where non-English contributions to the intellectual history are not perceived 
any more.  
Wieacker
83
 might be referred to as one of the few who looks behind the three big intellectual historical 
strains condensing the common European legal culture that unites the private law ‘in der Neuzeit’84 in 
three ‘invariables’ (1) personalism from, where there is a straight forward link to the key role of the 
individual, autonomy and freedom in private law. However without guidance on the differences; (2) 
legalism – decisions are bound to the rule of law and (3) European intellectualism ‘driving European 
legal thinking in the direction of thematisation, conceptualization, and contradiction-free consistency 
of empirical legal materials’. However, is this correct? Is the revitalization of the common European 
legal culture after the Second World War not very much guided by the political purpose it had to 
fulfill? Has the common European legal culture to be regarded as an attempt to rewrite legal history? I 
fear, the question is too big and too far-reaching to be answered in this paper.
85
 The debate on the 
possible legal philosophical foundations of Europe,
86
 let alone the foundations of European private 
law
87
 is just about to start. The handbook edited by Julie Dickson and Pavlos Eleftheriadis
88
 on the 
‘philosophical foundations of EU law’ mainly focuses on European constitutional theory, European 
private law and European private law theory does not form part of that project.
89
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More promising for getting an understanding of the European model of freedom of contract - but also 
much more modest - is to look at the intellectual history (constitutional history?) of the European 
Union. This requires a big jump from the 17
th
-18
th
-19
th
 century into the post-war period, the launching 
of the European Economic Community, re-constituted first as the European Community and then the 
European Union. F. Wieacker, P. Grossi, H. Coing – the academic side, J. Monnet, R. Schuman, de 
Gasperi, de Gaulle, K Adenauer - the political side, all advocated for the revitalization and the re-
invigoration of  
a common European culture such as to enable a peaceful and prosperous future for the European 
peoples. Peace through economic integration this was the order of the day. In 1986, the Single 
European Act added social integration to the new European legal order.
90
  
Economic integration of the EU is based on the four freedoms and competition. In particular German 
academics in the ordo-liberal tradition have argued that private autonomy is enshrined into the four 
freedoms.
91
 Economic integration aims at ‘enabling’, at paving the way for private entrepreneurship in 
the ever bigger first common and then European market. Behind the abundant case-law of the ECJ on 
the four freedoms there is more often than not a contractual dispute, one party to the contract is 
seeking access to the market and is barred by national statutory regulation.
92
 Private autonomy then 
gets  
a different meaning, it is bound to transborder business, to European economic integration. The 
European variant is functional and instrumental.  
Social regulation in European private law is very much focused on consumer protection.
93
 The tone is 
still set by the famous Sutherland report. Consumers and consumer protection rules are needed to 
complete the Internal Market (the 1986 program behind the Single European Act). Put differently, 
there is a price to pay for the Completion of the Internal Market and this price is the adoption of 
minimum
94
 social (protection) standards. The overall philosophy is enshrined in the wording of Article 
114 TFEU (formerly Article 95 EC, Article 100a respectively), adoption measures to complete the 
Internal Market in realizing social protection standards. Since the mid-1980s – several consumer 
protection rules and also labour protection rules were already adopted in the late 1970s or the early 
1980s under the unanimity principle, - the enabling and the framing of autonomy go hand-in-hand, 
although realized with a certain time lag. The broadening of the economic freedoms, very much along 
the line of the common law understanding of freedom of contract, precedes the development of 
protective standards that limit the freedom of contract, mainly through binding legal standards. 
The development is by no means limited to the field of traditional private law, contract law and 
consumer protection or employment contracts and labour protection. European private law is 
‘regulatory’ by nature, as the European Union is and remains a project under constant construction. 
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For its realization legal rules remain a key instrument. The most prominent field of action outside and 
beyond traditional private law and even beyond traditional fields of social regulation (consumer and 
labour protection) has been the so-called regulated markets. The liberalization and privatization policy 
triggered by the Single European Act in telecom, energy, postal services, transport and financial 
services, the dismantling of former state monopolies, more generally the political decision to establish 
markets where there were none, this policy made the link between enabling freedom of contract whilst 
at the same time setting boundaries to that freedom even more feasible. Enabling and restricting are 
the two parameters that characterize the European model of freedom of contract.  
Stand and stare 
Provided my analysis contains an element of truth - what I do hope – what is the added value of this 
finding for our understanding of ‘freedom of contract’ and even more so for the communication 
between lawyers across legal cultures and traditions, just like in our Academy for International 
Commercial and Consumer Law? First and foremost it means ‘Stand and Stare’95 – trying to gain 
distance to our subject of analysis, to our own cultural roots and traditions. Esser’s book on 
preconceptions cannot be read  
as a manual to bridge the gap between our preconceptions and the law in the books and the law in 
action. I understand it more as a message of caution and modesty.  
‘Stand and stare’, however, is no more than just a first step. I do not want to argue that our legal 
cultures and traditions are set in stone and that there is no room for mutual learning and for change. 
Indeed, there is something like an emerging European legal culture, certainly in key areas of private 
law
96
 – some would argue it is enshrined ever since the ius commune - there exists even an emerging 
culture  
of transnational law
97
 – now gaining ever stronger attention in a refocused understanding and design of 
comparative and transnational (legal) history.
98
 I fear, however, that we are approaching a divided 
legal world, a national one, connected to the respective state, the national legal order, the territory and 
the language and a transnational one, where there is a chance for deepening of our understanding of  
the ‘many faces of freedom of contract’, for learning from each other and for developing even a 
common cultural ground.
99
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